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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Roadmap
The purpose of this comment is to identify the potential for mistreat-
ment of workers belonging to various ethnic groups in the United States
workforce due to the recent proliferation of Social Security Administra-
tion "mismatch letters." Part II recognizes the ever-expanding number of
foreign laborers toiling in the domestic economy. Part III provides an
overview of mismatch letters. Part IV illustrates a cumbersome duality
that faces employers: on one hand, employers are forbidden from em-
ploying undocumented workers, while, on the other hand, employers
must not utilize discriminatory hiring practices. In Part V, the compre-
hensive federal immigration and employment statute, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 is examined. Part VI addresses the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") as a potential means for employ-
ers to determine the work authorization status of potential hirees. Part
VII consults professional advice for a course of conduct employers may
pursue after receiving a mismatch letter. Lastly, Part VIII advocates leg-
islation that would provide employers with concrete guidance when in
receipt of a mismatch letter, thus protecting employees from possible
retaliation.
B. The Problem
American Hispanic communities are flourishing. According to Census
projections, Hispanics will represent approximately 13% of the total
United States population in 2003, accounting for some 36 million per-
sons.' This increase is largely attributed to the influx of Mexican citizens
. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, PROJECTIONS OF THE TOTAL
RESIDENT POPULATION BY 5-YEAR AGE GROUPS, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN WITH
SPECIAL AGE CATEGORIES: MIDDLE SERIES, 2001 TO 2005, at http://www.census.gov/popu-
lation/projections/nation/summary/np-t4-b.txt (last visited Mar. 25, 2003) (providing annual
population projections by age and race). Interestingly, for the 2000 Census, nearly half
(48%) of Hispanics indicated that they were White. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000 (Internet Release), at
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seeking opportunities in the American workplace.2 In its 1997 Report to
Congress, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform listed the "Top
Ten Countries of Origin of Legal Immigrants:"
Mexico 159,731
Philippines 55,778
India 44,781
Vietnam 42,006
Mainland China 41,662
Dominican Republic 39,516
Cuba 26,415
Ukraine 21,051
Russia 19,646
Jamaica 19,029. 3
Although this information is dated, it illustrates the overwhelming
abundance of Mexican immigrants assimilating to the United States. Ac-
cording to the data, there were approximately 185 percent more legal
Mexican immigrants than legal Philipino immigrants, the second most nu-
merous ethnic group entering the country.4 This is largely due to wages,
hours, and working conditions available from domestic employers which
are far superior to those available south of the U.S. border.5 Moreover,
logic dictates that the numbers of undocumented immigrants will be even
more heavily weighted toward Mexicans. This, primarily, is attributable
to the convenience of the 2,000 mile border between northern Mexico
and the southwest United States.6
The increasing population, both United States citizen and immigrant,
means that American companies will be employing ever-growing num-
bers of Hispanic workers. As such, there is potential for distrust. An
untrusting employer leads to two possible harms. First, potential hirees
may be turned away by employers who are weary of violating the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act's (IRCA) provisions prohibiting the em-
http://www.census.gov/population/pop-profile/2000/chapO2.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2003)
(explaining the Census report's new category of choosing only one race to represent the
person).
2. See Karen Fleshman, Abrazando Mexicanos: The United States Should Recognize
Mexican Workers' Contributions to its Economy by Allowing Them to Work Legally, 18
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 237, 239 (2002).
3. U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN:
IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY, Viii (1997).
4. Id.
5. See Fleshman, supra note 2, at 237.
6. JoAnne D. Spotts, U.S. Immigration Policy on the Southwest Border From Reagan
Through Clinton, 1981-2001, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 601, 601 (2002).
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ployment of undocumented workers. This, could have a chilling effect
that injures legitimate, law-abiding applicants who might be refused em-
ployment based solely on their name or skin color. Second, current em-
ployees might face capricious termination simply predicated upon the
employer's receipt of a Social Security Administration (SSA) mismatch
letter.7
In the end, will the American workforce see a reluctance to employ
Hispanic laborers? Possibly. Will the net result of SSA mismatch letters
cause widespread paranoia in human resource departments? Probably.
Is it even remotely possible that the mismatch letters will save the floun-
dering Social Security program by driving down operational costs?'
Unlikely.
II. GENERAL IMMIGRATION INFORMATION
The United States has long been lauded for its liberal immigration poli-
cies.9 An idea deeply rooted in American history, the United States is a
melting pot of diverse cultures and people)0°
Immigration to the United States has created one of the world's most
successful multiethnic nations. We believe these truths constitute the
distinctive characteristics of American nationality:
* American unity depends upon a widely-held belief in the princi-
ples and values embodied in the American Constitution and
their fulfillment in practice: equal protection and justice under
the law; freedom of speech and religion; and representative
government;
" Lawfully admitted newcomers of any ancestral nationality -
without regard to race, ethnicity, or religion - truly become
Americans when they give allegiance to these principles and
values;
7. Although lacking a formal definition, a mismatch letter is generally sent by the SSA
to alert employers that they may be illegally employing unauthorized workers. The letters
are discussed in length in PART III, infra.
8. An argument can be made that mismatch letters can prevent the need for expensive
"suspense accounts" to be created and maintained for individual taxpayers. This idea will
be discussed in detail in PART III, infra.
9. Enid Trucios-Haynes, Temporary Workers and Future Immigration Policy Conflicts:
Protecting U.S. Workers and Satisfying the Demand for Global Human Capital, 40 BRAN-
DEIS L.J. 967, 970 (2002); James F. Smith, A Nation That Welcomes Immigrants? An His-
torical Examination of United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
227, 228 (1995).
10. William Booth, The Myth of the Melting Pot, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1998, at Al,
available at 1998 WL 2469212.
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* Ethnic and religious diversity based on personal freedom is
compatible with national unity; and
" The nation is strengthened when those who live in it communi-
cate effectively with each other in English, even as many per-
sons retain or acquire the ability to communicate in other
languages.
As long as we live by these principles and help newcomers to learn
and practice them, we will continue to be a nation that benefits
from substantial but well-regulated immigration. We must pay at-
tention to our core values, as we have tried to do in our recom-
mendations throughout this report. Then, we will continue to
realize the lofty goal of E Pluribus Unum."
-1997 Report to Congress
According to the Bureau of the Census, the total population of the
United States reached over 290 million in January, 2003.12 The 2000 Cen-
sus, which reported some 281 million Americans, reflects an increase of
32.7 million people from the prior Census.1 3 The previous record in-
crease occurred between the 1950 and 1960 decennial censuses, and is
referred to as the "baby boom" increase of 28 million.14 Under President
Clinton's directive, a government task force determined immigration to
account for approximately one-third of the U.S. population growth in
1994.15
In September 2000, the population of illegal immigrants in the United
States was estimated to be as high as twelve million.16 Furthermore, the
average rate of illegal population increase is estimated at 275,000 or
more, annually.1 7 Thousands of undocumented aliens cross the border
between Mexico and the United States on a daily basis. 8
11. BECOMING AN AMERICAN, supra note 3, at iv-v.
12. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, at http://
www.census.gov (last visited Mar. 25, 2003) (providing a real-time population counter for
the United States, as estimated by the Census Bureau).
13. Anne H. Ehrlich & James Salzman, The Importance of Population Growth to Sus-
tainability, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10559, *8 (2002), WL 32 ELR 10559; POPULATION PROFILE
OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 2-1.
14. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, LARGEST CENSUS-TO-CENSUS POPULATION IN-
CREASE IN U.S. HISTORY AS EVERY STATE GAINS, at http://www.numbersusa.com/over-
population/census.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
15. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, POPULATION AND CON-
SUMPTION TASK FORCE REPORT 15 (1996).
16. Spotts, supra note 6, at 601, 602.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Economic elements create both push and pull factors that draw immi-
grants, especially Mexican immigrants, into the United States. 9 One es-
timate predicts Hispanics to be the largest minority in the United States,
accounting for some 98.2 million persons, or 24% of the population, by
the year 2050.20 Logically, the push factors are those which contribute to
a person's desire to flee the country of their origin. Push factors might
include: impoverished living conditions, high unemployment rates, vola-
tile political regimes, overcrowding, and oppression.2' By contrast, pull
factors are perceived characteristics of a country that are appealing to
immigrants. Pull factors making the United States workforce seem entic-
ing may consist of the following: higher wages, improved benefits, possi-
bility for education, political stability, and the existence of social service
programs.2 As long as economic inequalities exist between the United
States and the immigrants' countries of origin, these push and pull effects
will continue to flourish, regardless of domestic immigration policies.23
With the ever-increasing number of legal and illegal immigrants enter-
ing the United States on a daily basis, immigration questions are sure to
remain in the limelight. It follows logically that these immigrants will
seek out employment in order to sustain themselves in a capitalistic soci-
ety. In fact, employment is considered the central reason that illegal
aliens are attracted to the United States.2 4
As such, many Americans harbor resentment against migrant workers,
adopting the notion that immigrants are usurping "American" jobs.2 5
When faced with economic downturns, politicians blame illegal immi-
grants for "stealing" positions in the American workforce. 26 Many unem-
ployed workers harbor deep-rooted antipathy against immigrants for
occupying the jobs of "real" Americans.2 7 Immigrant workers have even
19. Fleshman, supra note 2, at 237-38.
20. Elizabeth M. Dunne, Comment, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration Policy:
Understanding Why Congress Should Enact an Enforcement Statute for Undocumented
Workers, 49 EMORY L.J. 623, 624 (2000).
21. Spotts, supra note 6, at 601, 602.
22. Id.
23. Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor
Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 358 (2001).
24. NANCY HUMEL MONTWIELER, THE IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW OF 1986: ANALY-
SIS, TEXT, AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 31 (1987).
25. Dunne, supra note 20, at 631; Note, Racial Violence Against Asian Americans, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1926, 1931 (1993); Jennifer A. Nemec, Comment, Yniguez v. Arizonans for
Official English: Free Speech May Have Lost the Battle, But in the End it Will Win the War,
22 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 117, 118 (1998).
26. Dunne, supra note 20, at 631.
27. Racial Violence Against Asian Americans, supra note 25, at 1931.
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been called pariahs, and labeled as a source of pain for American
households.2 8
The question then is how will their respective employers handle their
arrival? Immigrant workers, especially undocumented workers, are sus-
ceptible to discrimination because they are unlikely to report unfair labor
practices.29 Such practices might include paying decreased wages to un-
documented workers, forcing them to work greater numbers of hours, or
providing them with sub-standard working conditions. Undocumented
workers might not report such unfair labor practices in fear of losing their
jobs, or fear of deportation. 30 Even more problematic would be a policy
whereby an employer terminates employees who are the subjects of mis-
match letters, without providing a procedure for re-verification of work
authorization.31
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MISMATCH LETTERS
Social Security and welfare programs are common topics in political
forums. Discussions often consider the fate of such programs, which nat-
urally includes an inquiry into the financial forecast of Social Security
considering the current taxation rates.
Social Security now takes in more in taxes than it pays out in bene-
fits. The excess funds are credited to Social Security's trust funds,
which are expected to grow to over $4 trillion before we need to use
them to pay benefits. In 2017, we'll begin paying more in benefits
than we collect in taxes. By 2041, the trust funds will be exhausted
and the payroll taxes collected will be enough to pay only about 73
percent of benefits owed. We'll need to resolve long-range financial
issues to make sure Social Security will provide a foundation of pro-
tection for future generations as it has done in the past.32
-2002 Social Security Statement
The following sections address policies and protocol for the Social Se-
curity Administration. The focus is on the recent decision to decrease the
28. Nemec, supra note 25, at 118.
29. Irene Zopoth Hudson & Susan Schenck, Note, America: Land of Opportunity or
Exploitation?, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 351, 356 (2002).
30. Id.
31. David H. Nachman & Debi Debiak, An Imperfect Match, HRMAG., Sept. 1, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 7664718; SSA is Sending Out Mismatch Notices, NEwSLINE (Associ-
ated Landscape Contractors of Mass., S. Natick, Mass.), July/Aug. 2002, at 3, http://
www.alcom.org/ALCM%20News%20JA%2002.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
32. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY STATEMENT 1
(2002).
2003]
THE SCHOLAR
threshold requirement prompting the issuance of mismatch letters. As a
result, the number of employers receiving mismatch letters is on the rise.
The receipt of a mismatch letter could adversely affect immigrant work-
ers or ethnic employees to a greater extent than Anglo workers.
A. Annual Wage Information
Every employer must annually submit Copy A of Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) Form W-2 (W-2) to report wages earned and taxes with-
held for each employee for the previous year.33 Ideally, when the Social
Security Administration receives the W-2 data, it automatically updates
the wage credits to the respective employee's social security account. 34
Often, however, SSA is unable to post the W-2 earnings to any individual
account because of inconsistencies between the worker's name, birthdate,
or social security number (SSN).3 5 When SSA is unable to post the W-2
earnings, a suspense account is created, and the reported wage informa-
tion is held indefinitely pending verification.36
Legitimate reasons often exist for inaccurate or discrepant W-2 infor-
mation.37 Common reasons for erroneous filings include name changes
(marriage), clerical error/transposed digit (either by employee or em-
ployer), or use of a non-Roman name.38 The SSA claims the majority of
mistakes are the result of human blunder and typographical errors, in-
cluding changed or hyphenated last names such as compound, shortened,
and women's names. 
3 9
33. J. Ira Burkemper, The "Mismatch Letter" Is in the Mail: The Social Security Ad-
ministration Ramps Up Its Warnings to Employers, 4 (2002), at http://
www.entertheusa.com/publications/mismatchletter.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Social Security "Mismatch" Letter a Trap for the Unwary Employer, WHAT'S NEW
(Fisher & Phillips, L.L.P., Atlanta, Ga.), available at http://www.laborlawyers.com/
FSL5CS/important%20new%201egal%20developments/impor-
tant%20new%20legal%20developments518.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2003); Handling the
Social Security "Mismatch Letter," EMPLOYER ADVISOR (Lane, Powell, Spears, Lubersky,
L.L.P., Seattle, Wa.), Summer 2002, at http://www.lanepowell.com/pressroom/newsletters/
detail.asp?NLID=317&XNLTYPEID=3 (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
38. Robert W. Karr, Jr., Social Security Number Mismatch Issues, Ross & HARDIES
IMMIGRATION LEGAL UPDATE (Ross & Hardies, Chicago, I11.), at http://
www2.rosshardies.com/publication.cfm?publication-id=224 (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
Although the source does not elaborate on the idea of "non-Roman" names, the author
must be referencing names that automatically indicate an ethnic, or non-Anglo, ancestry.
39. Form 1-9 and the Verification Process - Frequently Asked Questions (Jackson &
Hertogs, San Francisco, Cal.), August 2002, at http://www.jackson-hertogs.com/jh/faq/
8066.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
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B. Suspense Accounts
Suspense accounts become problematic for SSA because they are both
costly and time consuming.4n In 1999, approximately 216 million W-2s
were submitted to SSA by some 6.5 million employers.4 Roughly 88%
of the total W-2 forms were submitted accurately.4 2 SSA, however, is
concerned with rectifying the mistakes made by the remaining 12% of
employers who submit inaccurate W-2 information.43
Considering the bleak financial outlook already forecasted for social
security programs, the Administration is seeking ways to lower operating
costs." Curtailing the need for suspense accounts is one way SSA claims
costs can be reduced.45 The SSA proposes that properly submitted wage
reports cost less than 50 ¢ to post to an individual's earnings record.4 6
Suspense accounts, however, cost an average of $300 to maintain while
discrepancies are reconciled.47 The SSA estimates that 212 million items
were posted to suspense accounts between 1937 and 1999, with a total
value of approximately $262 billion. 8
C. The Mismatch Letter
In 1993, the SSA began notifying employers of discrepant filings.49
These letters, sometimes called "mismatch letters" or "Code V letters"
(because they contain the label Code V at the top), are considered to be
educational correspondence to employers.5" The SSA, then, must con-
tend that by alerting employers of the problem and warning them of pen-
alties the employers would take steps to ensure accuracy, and the SSA
would ultimately save money. A very different result, however, is plausi-
ble: the employer may elect to terminate the employee without allowing
adequate opportunity for the employee to rectify the situation. Such a
40. See Burkemper, supra note 33, at 6-7.
41. Id. at 1 5.
42. Id.
43. See id. (indicating that 585,000 employers (9%) "submitted wage items with one to
five errors," and 195,000 employers (3%) "reported six or more errors, and of those, only
about 3,000 reported 200 or more errors").
44. See id. at 91 6.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 9 9.
50. See Letter from Social Security Administration to Employer Having Submitted
Incorrect W-2 Form Wage Information, Retirement, Survivors' and Disability Insurance,
Employer Correction Request, (Mar. 22, 2001) (providing a sample mismatch letter), availa-
ble at http://www.shusterman.com/pdf/ssa-mismatch.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2003);
Burkemper, supra note 33, at 9 9.
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policy could prove destructive if employees were terminated because
their skin color or name created suspicion as to their work authorization.
Thus, in terms of social utility, the SSA's mismatch letters could do far
more harm than good. If the SSA is able to save a few million dollars at
the cost of furthering racially motivated or discriminatory employment
practices, then a grave injustice would occur.
The mismatch letters come in a variety of forms, but all generally in-
form employers that a discrepancy exists and that a suspense account has
been created for each employee whose SSN appears on the list provided
in the letters.51 While the notification may be necessary, the mismatch
letters fall short by failing to provide lucid instructions for employers.
The letters warn of potential fines, including possible criminal punish-
ment, for knowledgeable employment of an unauthorized worker.5 2 At
the same time, the letters are also quick to mention the possibility of legal
actions against employers, including suits for wrongful termination and
discrimination, should the employer abruptly terminate the implicated
employee because of the receipt of the mismatch letter.53
D. Policy Change
Since 1993, the SSA sent mismatch letters only to employers whose
annual wage reports included mismatches between submitted information
and SSA records for more than 10 % of the total employees reported by
that particular employer.54 Recently, the SSA announced a change in its
policy for the threshold criteria for issuing mismatch letters.5 Beginning
51. See Loan T. Huynh & Ingrid N. Nyberg, Responding to the SSA's "No Match"
Letters (Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minn.), at http://www.fredlaw.com/arti-
cles/employment/ empl_028_in.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
52. 26 U.S.C. § 6674 (2002); 26 C.F.R. § 31.6011(b) (2002).
53. Burkemper, supra note 33, at $ 9.
54. SSA Announces New Procedure for Issuing Mismatch Letters, EMPLOYMENT LAW
BULLETIN (Bingham McHale, L.L.P., Indianapolis, Ind.), May 2002, available at http://
www.binghammchale.com/pdf/May%20Employment%20Newsletter.pdf (last visited Mar.
25, 2003); Stephen W. Lyman et al., Social Security Administration Changes "Mismatch"
Letter Policy (Hall, Render, Killian, Heath & Lyman, P.S.C., Indianapolis, Ind.), July 30,
2002, at http://www.hallrender.com/articles/articles-details.asp?articleindex=11 (last vis-
ited Mar. 25, 2003); Social Security Administration Institutes New Mismatch Letter Policy,
IMMIGRATION Focus (Valentine Brown, L.L.C., Woodbury, N.J.) Apr. 2002, at http://
www.valentinebrown.com/news/vb_0402.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2003); Stanley Mailman
& Stephen Yale-Loehr, Social Security "Mismatch Letters" Jeopardize Jobs (True, Walsh &
Miller, L.L.P., Ithaca, N.Y.), at http://www.clubcyrus.com/twmlaw/site/new/ssmis-
match.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2003); see Jose A. Olivieri, Social Security Mismatch Let-
ters (Michael, Best & Friedrich, L.L.P., Milwaukee, Wis.), at http://www.mbf-law.com/pubs/
articles/629.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
55. Darby L. Duncan & Denise Rios, Avoiding Penalties When In Receipt of a Social
Security Mismatch Letter, EMPLOYMENT, LABOR AND BENEFITS, (Holland & Knight,
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with the 2002 wage reports, the SSA will send mismatch letters to every
employer who submits even one W-2 with incorrect information.56 Con-
sequently, while the Social Security Administration mailed roughly
110,000 mismatch letters in 2001, the SSA plans to send over 750,000 let-
ters in 2002. 51 Thus, many employers will be receiving their first mis-
match letters in the coming months.58 As these employers are likely to be
confused by the lack of direction found within the letters, the possibility
exists that employees will pay the ultimate price due to unwarranted
termination.59
IV. DECISIONS, DECISIONS
A. Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't
As increasing numbers of employers receive their first Social Security
Administration mismatch letters, they will be forced to make a difficult
decision: fire or inquire. Either way, severe ramifications can ensue.
On the one hand, under IRCA employers face monetary penalties for
the continued employment of undocumented workers.61 If, after review-
ing an employee's work authorization, the employer discovers a mistake
has been made, the employer faces charges of actual or constructive no-
L.L.P.), June 2002, at http://www.hklaw.com/newsletters.asp?ID=292&Article=1647 (last
visited Mar. 25, 2003); Hernan Rozemberg, Migrants Forced Out of Jobs, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
July 6, 2002, available at http://www.arizonarepublic.com/special03/articles/0706mis-
match06.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2003); Social Security Administration Increases Issuance
of "Mismatch" Letters, HUMAN RESOURCE & LABOR NEWS (The Associated General Con-
tractors of America, Alexandria, Virginia), June 27, 2002, (on file with author); John F.
Koryto & Michael E. Stroster, Social Security Administration Mismatch Letters to Increase,
EMPLOYER'S IMMIGRATION LAW UPDATE: PART I - IMMIGRATION AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
(Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey, P.L.C., Grand Rapids, Mich.), Summer 2002, at
http://www.millerjohnson.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/PR%20ELU%20Summer%202002.pdf
(last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
56. Employers Receive More Letters from Social Security Challenging Employees'
Numbers, IMMIGRATION ADVISORY (Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.,
Boston, Mass.), Summer 2002, available at http://www.mintz.com/newspubs/Immigration/
ImmAdvO6O2.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
57. Carl Shusterman, Employers: SA "Mismatch" Letters - How to Respond?, SHUS-
TERMAN'S IMMIGRATION UPDATE, (Law Offices of Carl Shusterman, Los Angeles, Cal.),
June 2002, at http://www.shusterman.com/jun02.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
58. A. Robert Degen, Employers With Inaccurate W-2s to Receive "Mismatch Letters"
from Social Security Administration, IMMIGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT ALERT (Fox,
Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, L.L.P., Philadelphia, Pa.), Aug. 2002, http://www.frof.com/
PDFs/MismatchLetters_0802.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
59. David Nachman & Debi Debiak, Social Security Mismatch Letters Are in the Mail,
169 NEW JERSEY L.J. 120, 1 (2002) available at http://www.gghlaw.com/ssletter.pdf (last
visited Mar. 28, 2003).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2000).
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tice. As such, a renewed inquiry could open the employer to IRCA pen-
alties. On the other hand, wrongful discharge of an authorized employee
could yield an onslaught of employment law actions under Title VII or
the Fair Labor Standards Act.61 Either way, the employer faces possible
repercussions. That being said, which avenue is the employer likely to
pursue?
It is all too possible that the employers will elect to terminate the sub-
jects of the mismatch letters instead of opening themselves to penalties.
Negative media attention, the added awareness of foreign workers fol-
lowing the September 11 attacks, and the inability of undocumented
workers to seek legal recourse are all strong factors which might contrib-
ute to a decision to terminate subjects of mismatch letters.
Employers are unlikely to willingly endure the stigma that attaches
when the media reports unauthorized employment practices.6" Although
employment of unauthorized workers at home receives less media atten-
tion than do labor camps abroad ("sweatshops," for instance), companies
are regularly burdened by campaigns alleging unfair labor practices.63
Considering the added attention regarding the status of foreign work-
ers following the September 11 attacks, employers are more likely to take
whatever action is necessary to avoid negative media publicity.64 Fur-
thermore, the tragedy 'of September 11 has created extreme tension
61. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1990) (Title VII antidiscrimination provisions);
8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a) (2000) (INA antidiscrimination provisions); 29 U.S.C. § 211 (1998)
(Fair Labor Standards Act data collection requirements); 29 U.S.C. § 215 (1998) (Fair La-
bor Standards Act prohibited acts).
62. U.S. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 142,143 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 2002) (reciting
a 36-count indictment for conspiracy to smuggle illegal workers to Tyson Foods processing
facilities). See generally James Salzman, Beyond the Smokestack: Environmental Protection
in the Service Economy, 30 ENvrL. L. REP. 10,856 (2000) (detailing boycotts of Wal-Mart,
Kathy Lee Gifford, The Gap, Nike, Footlocker, and Woolworth); Eric Brazil, Official Sal-
vadoran Report Says Its Factories are Brutal, May 11, 2001, at http://
www.sweatshopwatch.org/headlines/2001/elsalvador-may01.html (describing substandard
labor conditions in El Salvadoran factories producing garments for The Gap, Nike, Liz
Claiborne, and Kohl's) (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
63. See generally Salzman, supra note 62, at 856 (detailing boycotts of Wal-Mart,
Kathy Lee Gifford, The Gap, Nike, Footlocker, and Woolworth); Brazil, supra note 62
(describing substandard labor conditions in El Salvadoran factories producing garments for
The Gap, Nike, Liz Claiborne, and Kohl's).
64. Burkemper, supra note 33, at 2. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks,
Americans have heightened awareness concerning illegal immigration, placing a renewed
emphasis on federal immigration statutes designed to deter illegal immigration, such as
IRCA. William G. Phelps, Validity, Construction, and Application of § 274(a)(1)(A)(iv) of
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)), Making it Unlawful to
Induce or Encourage Alien to Come to, Enter, or Reside in United States, 137 A.L.R. FED.
227, 227 (1997) (addressing the effects of statutory regulations that deterred illegal immi-
gration prior to 1997).
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within both the Department of Justice and the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS) concerning the procurement and use of false identi-
fication.65 In response to external pressures, employers might adopt a
practice of immediate termination upon receipt of a mismatch letter.66
This, unfortunately, would be a blind acceptance of the notion that unau-
thorized workers lack the power to bring wrongful discharge claims, and
employees would pay the price.
B. No Reprieve for the Unauthorized
In Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc.,67 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held that an unauthorized employee had
no cause of action against his former employer under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the worker was not "qualified" for the
position when he sought reemployment.68 Similarly, in Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"),69 the United
States Supreme Court precluded the NLRB from awarding backpay to an
undocumented alien who never obtained work authorization in the
United States.7°
In the Hoffman opinion, written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
the Court announces that allowing unauthorized employees to recover
would erode federal immigration policy and would both condone past vi-
olations and encourage future defiance.71 Yet such an idea is not necessa-
rily exclusive of a benefit. Herein is the potential for a positive direction
in relation to mismatch letters: because IRCA focuses on the responsibili-
ties of the employer to verify an applicant's work authorization, awarding
backpay could be viewed as added incentive for the employer to fully
comply with its duties under the statutory scheme.
While it is true that such a result might impliedly cause undocumented
workers to continue to seek domestic employment, employers would
have further motivation to screen applicants more carefully. Following
the Hoffman Plastic decision, in an inter-agency memorandum addressed
to all Regional Directors, Officers-In-Charge and Resident Officers, the
65. Richard G. Vernon, Employer Obligations Under U.S. Immigration Law (Lerch,
Early & Brewer, Bethesda, Md.), at http://www.lerchearly.com/SummerNewsletter.pdf
(last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
66. Nachman & Debiak, supra note 59.
67. 153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1142 (1999).
68. Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 186 (4th Cir. 1988) cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1142 (1999).
69. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
70. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Board, 535 U.S. 137,
150 (2002).
71. Id. at 150-51.
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NLRB General Counsel stated that a discriminatee is not entitled to rein-
statement and backpay unless the INS determines the discriminatee to be
lawfully present in the United States.72
Thus, following Egbuna and Hoffman Plastic, employers would not
hesitate to terminate unauthorized employees because the employees
have no avenue of recourse. This presents potential for abuse. The possi-
bility exists that illegal workers will be recruited abroad by American em-
ployers, and then paid substandard wages.73 For example, in United
States v. Tyson Foods,4 the defendant faces charges of causing illegal
aliens to be brought into the United States for the purpose of employ-
ment.75 Likewise, legitimate employees possessing authentic work docu-
mentation could face termination at the hand of an untrusting employer
because of their ethnicity.76
V. SUMMARY OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND
CONTROL ACT OF 1-986
A. The Purpose of IRCA
In a series of cases, courts have consistently held that Congress, in en-
acting IRCA, intended to halt the flood of undocumented aliens into the
United States.77 In Etuk v. Slattery,78 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit stated that Congress sought to stem the tide of
undocumented aliens into the United States by enacting the elaborate
verification scheme of IRCA.79 Furthermore, in United States v. Jack-
son,80 the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained
that the passage of IRCA was aimed at reducing the number of illegal
aliens from crossing the border.81 The Fifth Circuit proposed that IRCA
72. Memorandum from Rosemary M. Collyer, NRLB General Counsel, to all Re-
gional Directors, Officers-In-Charge and Resident Officers (Sept. 1, 1988), available at
1988 WL 236182.
73. See generally U.S. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 142, 143 (D.D.C. Mar. 5,
2002) (discussing a 36-count indictment for conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens to work at
Tyson Foods processing facilities).
74. 191 F. Supp. 2d 142 (2002).
75. Tyson Foods, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 144 (noting that the probation hearing is set for
March 2003).
76. Authorized employees wrongly terminated would, however, be able to seek re-
course from the employer under employment law theories.
77. Robert F. Koets, Validity, Construction, and Application of § 274A of Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324A), Involving Unlawful Employment of Aliens, 130
A.L.R. FED. 381, 400 (1996).
78. See 936 F.2d 1433 (2d Cir. 1991).
79. See id. at 1437 (reviewing INS procedures for replacing lost or stolen green cards).
80. 825 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1987).
81. United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 864 n.6.
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would reduce alien traffic by removing economic benefits associated with
illegally coming to the United States.82
B. Prohibitions
Signed by President Reagan on November 6, 1986, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 198683 impacts the hiring procedures of all
employers.84 When signing the Act, President Reagan referred to IRCA
as "the most comprehensive reform of our immigration laws since
1952. ",85
IRCA specifically prohibits three employer activities:
1. It is unlawful to knowingly hire, or recruit for a fee, an alien who
is unauthorized to be employed in the United States;
2. It is unlawful to continue to employ an alien, knowing that the
alien is unauthorized to work in the United States; or
3. To hire an individual for employment in the United States without
complying with the employment verification system set up by the
statute.86
C. The Verification Process
IRCA sets up an employment verification system under which all em-
ployers must execute a verification form (Form 1-9) attesting, under pen-
alty of perjury, that the hirer has verified, by examination, the requisite
document or documents proving both identity and employment authori-
zation.87 This verification process must be completed for all new employ-
ees hired after November 6, 1986, whether the hiree is a United States
citizen or an alien. 88 Employers are required to examine an employee's
documentation and complete an 1-9 Form within three business days of
the hiring of an employee unless the length of employment is intended to
be less than three business days, in which case the 1-9 Form must be com-
pleted at the time of hire.8 9
82. Id.
83. Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 100 Stat. 3359
(1986) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
84. Nancy-Jo Merritt & Joanne T. Stark, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986: What Employers Need to Know, 22 ARIZ. B.J. 6, 6 (1987).
85. NICHOLAS LAHAM, RONALD REAGAN AND THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION RE-
FORM 1 (2000).
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)-(2) (2002).
87. Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(A).
88. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a) (2002).
89. Id. § 274a.2(b)(B)(iii).
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Form 1-9 establishes three categories of documents that the employee
may present to prove identity and/or work authorization.9° It is crucial
that the decision of which documents to proffer rests strictly with the em-
ployee. 91 The employer may not request or require any particular docu-
ment, risking charges of document abuse should the employer do so. 9 2
Documents in List A establish both the holder's identity and authoriza-
tion to work in the United States, and include a certificate of naturaliza-
tion and U.S. a Passport. 93 Documents in List B only establish identity,
and include a driver's license, a voter registration card, or a United States
military draft card.94 Documents in List C establish work authorization
alone, and might include a valid social security card or a birth
certificate.95
D. The Good Faith Defense: Merely a Rebuttable Presumption
IRCA provides that an employer who has complied in good faith with
the verification requirements has established an affirmative defense to an
allegation that the person has knowingly hired an alien or continues to
employ an alien that is not authorized to be employed in the United
States.96 This affirmative defense of good faith compliance with IRCA,
however, is only a rebuttable presumption.97 The presumption is rebut-
ted if the Immigration and Naturalization Service can establish, inter alia,
that the verification documents did not "reasonably appear on their face
to be genuine." 98
E. Enforcement Powers
IRCA authorizes the Attorney General to investigate violations of the
statute.99 The duty to investigate such violations, though, has been as-
90. Martha J. Schoonover & Marti Nell Hyland, Employment Authorization Regula-
tions and 1-9 Compliance, SF82 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 243, 249-50 (May 3, 2001), available at
www.westlaw.com.
91. Id. at 249.
92. Id. at 254.
93. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(A) (2002).
94. Id. § 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(B).
95. Id. § 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(C).
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3) (2000).
97. See Collins Foods Int'l, Inc. v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
948 F.2d 549, 553 n.9 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing The House Judiciary Committee Report, H.R.
REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1 at 56-57 (1986)).
98. See id. (citing The House Judiciary Committee Report, H.R. REP. No. 99-682 pt.
1, at 57 (1986)).
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e) (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2000).
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signed to the INS. a00 Persons charged with IRCA violations are entitled
to notice and a hearing conducted by an administrative law judge (ALJ)
in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.' 0a
An AU may require violators of IRCA's employment provisions to
pay civil money penalties, and may issue a cease and desist order requir-
ing future compliance with the statute.'0 2 A pattern or practice of em-
ployment violations may lead to criminal penalties.103 However, civil
monetary penalties are the avenue generally sought.1"4
A failure to adhere to the employment verification system, referred to
as a paperwork violation, will lead to only a civil money penalty, gener-
ally of a lesser amount than for an employment violation.' 0 5 Paperwork
violations can arise from failure "to complete, correct, update, reverify,
retain, or produce Form 1-9."1°6 When determining the appropriate pen-
alty for paperwork violations, an ALJ may consider: (1) the size of the
employer's business; (2) the employer's good faith; (3) the seriousness of
the violation; (4) whether the individual involved was an unlawful alien;
and (5) whether the employer has a history of violations.0 7
100. 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2002); 8 C.F.R. § 100.2(a) (2002). Signed into law on November
25, 2002 by President George W. Bush, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which completely subsumed the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. See generally Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. The INS is abolished as an agency of the Department
of Justice, and its duties are to be divided and assigned to new bureaus within the DHS.
Leigh McCarthy, The Immigration Case of Michel Jalbert Teaches Larger Lessons, 18 ME.
B.J. 18, 21, n.18 (2003). As of March 1, 2003 the INS was eliminated and replaced by three
DHS bureaus. Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Steven C. Bell, INS Transitions to Department of
Homeland Security, IMMIGR. Bus. NEWS & COMMENT, Mar. 15, 2003, available at 2003 WL
1090283. "The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) takes over the INS
function of adjudicating applications for immigration benefits, including visa petitions, ap-
plication to adjust or change status, and naturalization applications." Id. "The Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) brings together the Border Patrol, INS inspec-
tions services, and Customs Service inspectors." Id. "The Bureau of Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (BICE) brings together the enforcement and investigative arms of the
INS, Customs Service, and the Federal Protective Service." Id. Because the author is un-
sure of exactly which DHS bureau will handle mismatch investigations at time of publica-
tion, INS will remain in the text of the comment.
101. See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(3) (2000).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2000).
103. Id. § 1324a(f).
104. Carl Shusterman, INS v. INC.: Immigration Laws Place Employers on the Defen-
sive: A Delicate Balancing Act is Required, http://www.shusterman.com/sanction.html (last
visited Mar. 28, 2003).
105. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5) (2000), with 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4).
106. Schoonover & Hyland, supra note 90, at 261.
107. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(2) (2002); INS Continues Enhanced Employer Sanctions
Effort, 69 IrER. REL. 253, 255-56 (1992).
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F. Violations
To violate IRCA an employer must knowingly hire for employment or
knowingly continue to employ an unauthorized alien.10 8 The general
public often mistakenly characterizes IRCA as a strict liability statute,
overlooking the fact that knowledge is required for violations.10 9 One
commentator theorizes that this misconception, above all others, results
in violations of IRCA's antidiscrimination provision."'
Actual knowledge of the status of the unauthorized worker may be
determined during an INS investigation by a statement given by the alien,
or an admission by the employer or an informant.1 1' Additionally, an
agent's actual knowledge may be imputed to the employer's actual
knowledge for the purposes of employer sanctions.11 2
More often, the "knowingly" provision has been subject to a construc-
tive knowledge test.'13 In instances where the employer is willfully blind
to circumstances that should have put the employer on notice that the
employer may have hired or may have continued to employ an unautho-
rized alien, the knowledge element is satisfied." 4 No actual, specific
knowledge is necessary."1
5
Constructive knowledge is defined as "knowledge imputed to a person
who, through the exercise of reasonable care or because of position or
skill, should have been aware of the fact. 11 6 The INS has signified that
the determination of whether a particular employer has been put on no-
tice of an employment situation in violation of IRCA is an individualized
decision that must consider all relevant facts and circumstances.' 17
For example, in New El Rey Sausage Co. v. U.S. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service," 8 constructive knowledge was found where the INS
108. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
109. Andrew M. Strojny, IRCA's Antidiscrimination Provision: How it Works and Can
it Be Used to Combat Anti-Immigrant Fears?, at http://users.erols.com/astrojny/IR-
CAArt.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
110. Id.
111. Schoonover & Hyland, supra note 90, at 262.
112. Id.
113. See Mester Mfg. Co. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 879 F.2d 561, 567
(9th Cir. 1989); New El Rey Sausage Co. v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 925
F.2d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 1991).
114. See Mester Mfg., 879 F.2d at 567; New El Rey Sausage, 925 F.2d at 1158.
115. See Mester Mfg., 879 F.2d at 567; New El Rey Sausage, 925 F.2d at 1158.
116. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 359 (7th ed. 2000).
117. Social Security Administration Changes Its Policy Regarding the Issuance of "Mis-
match Letters" (Masuda, Funai, Eifert & Mitchell, Ltd., Chicago, I1.), August 2002, at http:/
/www.masudafunai.com/english/articles/information/08-28-2002.asp (last visited Apr. 1,
2003).
118. 925 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
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visited an employer's plant and obtained a list of employees." 9 The INS
then notified the employer that certain employees were suspected of be-
ing unlawful aliens, and if their green cards matched the number listed in
the INS letter to the employer, then they were either using fraudulent
cards or cards belonging to someone else.120 The employer did not take
any corrective action other than to ask the named employees whether
they were work authorized.12' Seven of the nine listed employees left,
but the remaining two insisted they were authorized to work.1 22 The em-
ployer accepted their word, and continued to employ the remaining two
without further inquiry. 123 In this case, the court found that when the
INS had notified the employer of the suspected unlawful aliens, and
stated that the employment of the suspected individuals should not be
continued unless valid employment authorization could be provided, the
employer was put on constructive notice.
124
In Mester Mfg. Co. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,125 con-
structive knowledge was also found when the INS, after visiting an em-
ployer to inspect paperwork, ran checks on the alien registration numbers
of the workers, and unmasked improper or borrowed numbers.126 The
INS then hand-delivered a citation to the employer reciting the results of
its investigation and instructed the employer to consider the listed em-
ployees to be unauthorized aliens unless valid documents could be
presented. 127 The citation also stated that continued employment of un-
documented aliens would result in fine proceedings. 128 Nevertheless, the
employer in Mester continued to employ the unauthorized workers, and
constructive knowledge was imputed.1
29
In Collins Food International, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,'3 ° the employer's faulty inspection of a social security card at the
time of hire was not found to be constructive knowledge of an employee's
lack of work authorization. 131 The court stated that the reasonable man
119. New El Rey Sausage, 925 F.2d at 1155.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1159.
125. 879 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1989).
126. See Mester Mfg. Co. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 879 F.2d 561, 564,
569 (9th Cir. 1989).
127. See Mester Mfg., 879 F.2d at 564.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 567.
130. 948 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1991).
131. Collins Foods Int'l, Inc. v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
948 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir. 1991).
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standard should be used to emphasize that employers should accept doc-
uments which appear genuine on their face without requiring further in-
vestigation. 132 Furthermore, the Judiciary Committee Report in IRCA
cautions employers against making "critical judgments" about the au-
thenticity of prospective employees' documents. 33 Instead, employers
may hire such individuals and ask that INS audit the documents. 134
Employers should find little solace in Collins, though, as the mistake
could still represent a paperwork violation resulting in civil penalties
under IRCA.135 Additionally, United States v. Haim, Co.1 36 recites that a
paperwork violation of IRCA resulting from failure to accurately verify a
worker's employment authorization is not, in itself, sufficient to prove the
scienter element for an IRCA violation.137
In addition to setting forth the limitations of the constructive knowl-
edge test, Collins also provides employers with sound advice on compli-
ance with IRCA. The court in Collins recommends that employers
attempting to comply with IRCA are well advised not to examine an em-
ployee's work authorization documents until after an offer of employ-
ment is made. 38 The court recognized that an employer conducting pre-
employment questioning concerning an applicant's national origin, race
or citizenship exposes the employer to charges of discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if he does not hire that
applicant.1 39
G. "Good Faith"
The good faith of an employer is frequently contested. Proof of good
faith compliance with the statute provides employers with an affirmative
defense to IRCA's penalties.14 °
In United States v. Williams Produce, Inc., 1 the INS sent the employer
a "Notice of Intent to Fine" resulting from numerous paperwork viola-
tions. 142 The INS intended to fine Williams $281,600 for the violations. 143
132. Collins Foods, 948 F.2d at 554.
133. H.R. REP. No. 99-682 (Part 1), at 62 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5665.
134. Id.
135. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5) (2000).
136. OCAHO No. 96A00069, 1998 WL 745994, (Feb. 20, 1998).
137. Id. at *6.
138. Collins Foods Int'l, Inc. v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
948 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1991).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2001e (2003).
140. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3) (2003).
141. OCAHO No. 93A00220, 1995 WL 265081 (Feb. 3, 1995).
142. United States v. Williams Produce, Inc., OCAHO No. 93A00220, 1995 WL
265081, at *1 (Feb. 3, 1995).
[Vol. 5:355
FIRE FIRST AND ASK QUESTIONS LATER
According to the INS, the employer failed to properly complete I-9s for
sixty-five employees, failed to prepare I-9s for 143 individuals, and failed
to require that 231 employees properly complete their 1-9s.144 In terms of
the employer's good faith, the ALJ noted that submission of I-9s, even
though incomplete, indicated that the employer was aware of IRCA's re-
quirements. 14 5 The employer argued that the hiring manager was a third
generation resident of the county and knew most of the employees, thus
negating his responsibility to verify their work authorizations. 146 Not sur-
prisingly, the ALJ rejected this argument as evidence of the employer's
good faith.1 47
Also, in United States v. Karnival Fashion, Inc.,148 good faith was con-
tested because the employer successfully completed some I-9s but failed
to complete or prepare others. 149 In Karnival, the ALJ held that the INS
must prove an employer's lack of good faith beyond mere failure of com-
pliance and must show some level of culpable behavior.1 50 The ALJ ad-
monished the holding in Williams Produce, stating that dismal 1-9
compliance alone should not affect the civil money penalties imposed.'
Lack of good faith can also be found during an INS site survey. In
United States v. Anchor Seafood Distribs., Inc., 52 an INS agent discov-
ered thirty-two undocumented workers hiding in an office attic. 153 The
employer was not allowed to assert good faith because, in the presence of
the agent, the employer looked into the attic and stated that no unautho-
rized workers were hiding there.154 The acts of the employer demon-
strated a level of culpability that was clearly contradictory to an assertion
of good faith on his part.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *6.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. OCAHO No. 95A00014, 1995 WL 626234 (July 20, 1995).
149. United States v. Karnival Fashion, Inc., OCAHO No. 95A00014, 1995 WL
626234, at *2 (July 20, 1995).
150. Id.
151. Id. at *3.
152. OCAHO No. 94A00095, 1995 WL 474129 (May 5, 1995).
153. United States v. Anchor Seafood Distrib., Inc., OCAHO No. 94A00095, 1995
WL 474129, at *4 (May 5, 1995).
154. Id.
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VI. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
A. The Statute
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was designed "to pierce the
veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency actions to the light of
public scrutiny."1 55 The FOIA exposes government agencies to public
examination, thus effectively destroying external barriers that breed
distrust.1 56
Generally, each agency is required to publish its administrative proce-
dures, including rules, available forms, and instructions.' 57 Agency poli-
cies and procedures are first published in the Federal Register, and
subsequently included in the Code of Federal Regulations. Policies
adopted by an agency but not yet published in the Federal Register must
be made available for public inspection and copying.158 The FOIA, how-
ever, does not apply to all information held by a federal agency.
There are nine enumerated situations in which federal agencies are not
required to disclose their secrets.1 59 For example, an agency is not re-
quired to disclose information that is specifically barred from disclosure
by another statute. 16' Federal income tax law provides that tax returns
and return information are confidential and prohibits the disclosure of
such information (including taxpayer identification number or SSN), ex-
cept in narrowly defined circumstances. 6 ' Thus, an employer cannot
simply obtain a list of all employee social security numbers in an attempt
to verify work authorization.
B. The Decisions
Courts have regularly held that federal agencies are not required to
disclose files containing information which would lead to a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy if made public. 162 At a minimum,
social security numbers are protected under this rule.
Two federal courts have found a clearly unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy in the release of social security numbers. 6 3 In Sheet Metal Workers
155. Dept. of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976).
156. Id.
157. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1)(A)-(E) (1995).
158. Id. §§ 552(a)(2)(A)-(C).
159. Id. §§ 552(b)(1)-(9).
160. Id. § 552(b)(3).
161. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (2002).
162. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1995) (listing personnel and medical files as examples).
163. Transp. Info. Serv., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 970 P.2d 166, 174 (Okla. 1998) (holding, in
a separate opinion by Okla. Supreme Court Chief Justice Kauger, that two federal courts
found an invasion of privacy for the release of SSNs).
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Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 19 v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs,' 64 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the release
of personal financial information, including social security numbers, con-
stituted a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.1 65 Also, in Greidinger
v. Davis,166 the Fourth Circuit found the required disclosure of voters'
social security numbers to be an invasion of privacy.1 67
C. Why Social Security Numbers are Protected
Equipped with another person's social security number, an individual
with compromised morals could obtain the other person's welfare bene-
fits, social security benefits, or paychecks. 168 Additionally, social security
numbers can be used to order new checks sent to a different address on
checking and credit card accounts. 1 69 Current trends involving identity
theft over the internet might further bolster the individual's right to pro-
tection of sensitive personal information, including social security
numbers.
D. An Alternative for Employers
Because personal information, including the SSN, is prohibited from
distribution to third parties, the SSA created the Employee Verification
Service (EVS).17 ° The SSA stated that the EVS was intended to be a free
and secure internet service to facilitate easy employee verification. 1 '
The EVS allows employers to request that SSA verify the names,
birthdates, and social security numbers of employees prior to submission
of the annual W-2 Forms.' 72 To protect the privacy of employees, the
SSA does not divulge the requested information, but instead reviews data
submitted by the employer for accuracy.' 73 Thus, the employer gets a
164. 135 F.3d 891 (3d Cir. 1998).
165. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 19 v. United States Dept. of
Veterans Affairs, 135 F.3d 891, 902-05 (3d Cir. 1998).
166. 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993).
167. Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1354 (4th Cir. 1993).
168. Elizabeth Neuffer, Victims Urge Crackdown on Identity Theft, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 9, 1991, at 13.
169. Michael Quint, Bank Robbers' Latest Weapon: Social Security Numbers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, at 7.
170. See generally SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., EMPLOYEE VERIFICATION SERVICE
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simple "yes" or "no" as to the correctness of personnel records. Logically
then, the EVS is useful for verifying company files, and possibly prevent-
ing the issuance of mismatch letters for inaccuracies. It does not, how-
ever, impinge on employee privacy rights because protected information
is not simply handed out to any inquiring party.
The EVS strikes a balance between the rights of employers and the
rights of employees. The privacy interests of employees are protected
from outside intrusion into their personal records maintained by the So-
cial Security Administration. Alternatively, employers are given an op-
portunity to maintain accurate company files, and prevent "mismatch"
discrepancies from occurring.
VII. COURSE OF CONDUCT WHEN IN RECEIPT OF A
MISMATCH LETTER
What actions, if any, should an employer take after receiving a mis-
match letter? Although courts have not yet addressed the issue, the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service Office of General Counsel has
provided some guidance.
A. Martin Letter
In his letter of December 23, 1997, then General Counsel David A.
Martin begins by advising recipients that a mismatch letter alone does not
put the employer on notice that the employee is unauthorized to work. 174
Constructive knowledge, he says, is an individualized determination that
hinges upon all relevant facts.175 Mr. Martin asserts that no social secur-
ity numbers have been issued with 000, 800, or 900 areas (the first three
digits in a social security number). 76 Thus, an employer should be
alerted that a potential problem exists if a worker presents a social secur-
ity number beginning with a zero, eight, or nine.
More importantly, Martin suggests that upon receipt of notification the
employer solicit any useful information regarding the accuracy of com-
pany records from the employee.177 If the employee determines that ei-
ther the name or social security numbers are incorrect, Mr. Martin
174. Letter from David A. Martin, then Immigration and Naturalization Service Gen-
eral Counsel, to Bruce R. Larson (Dec. 23, 1997), available at http://www.shusterman.com/
pdf/ssa-martin97.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
175. Id.
176. Id. "A valid SSN must have a total of nine digits. The first three digits are re-
ferred to as the area, the next two as the group, and the last four as the serial. No SSNs
with a 000 area number, or an area number in the 800 or 900 series, have been issued.
Also, no SSNs with a 00 group or 0000 serial number have been issues." Id.
177. Id.
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suggests that the employer ask to see verification of the contradicted in-
formation. 78 Interestingly, though, there is no mention of potential for
document abuse in this situation.
Mr. Martin also discusses the scenario where a previously unauthorized
employee subsequently gains work authorization and notifies the em-
ployer of a SSN change.179 Without any mention of adherence to com-
pany fraud policies, Martin reminds the reader that knowingly providing
false statements on a Form 1-9 or using false documents to obtain employ-
ment are felonies unexcused by later work authorization. 180
Ultimately, Martin's letter gives scant insight into the steps an em-
ployer should take to protect itself from IRCA violations. Instead, the
letter fosters the underlying notion that document fraud is all-too-possi-
ble at the hiring stage. In doing so, Mr. Martin bolsters potential employ-
ers' fears, and in the end, may give rise to employment discrimination.
B. Virtue Letter
In another letter from the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
then General Counsel Paul W. Virtue confronts the issue of employment
discrimination.181 In his letter of April 12, 1999, Mr. Virtue addresses
Section 274B of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which, he claims,
expresses the goal that citizens and aliens alike not lose employment op-
portunities unnecessarily.1 82
To counteract any fears of potential discrimination, Mr. Virtue reiter-
ates that the mismatch letter, viewed alone, does not constitute actual
notice of a lack of work authorization.' 83 Directly adverse to this posi-
tion, Virtue further emphasizes that an employer may not safely ignore
the consequences of Social Security Administration discrepancies.184
Virtue explains that employer follow-up is crucial to alleviate potential
liability.1 85 He does admit, however, that the statute does not specifically
require nor prohibit such follow-up investigation. 86 Perhaps detailed in-
struction on how an employer might lawfully conduct follow-up investiga-
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Letter from Paul W. Virtue, then Immigration and Naturalization Service Gen-
eral Counsel, to undisclosed recipient (Apr. 12, 1999), available at http://
www.shusterman.com/pdf/ins-ssa499.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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tions upon the receipt of a mismatch letter would help lessen the burdens
placed on employers and employees alike.
VIII. STATUTORY REFORM
The underlying problem simply revolves around a lack of information.
The breakdown is not complex: (1) a comprehensive federal statute gov-
erns the responsibilities of employers concerning immigrant laborers; (2)
the Immigration and Naturalization Service has the jurisdiction to investi-
gate possible non-compliance; (3) for its own fiscal reasons, the Social
Security Administration decided to drastically increase the recipient pool
of its mismatch letters.
Viewed in a vacuum, each subpart is coherent and understandable.
Yet, when synergy is added to the equation, the component parts total a
bewildering beast. Virtually all inconsistencies can be resolved with Con-
gressional action.
A. At the Time of Hire
As stated previously, IRCA presents a contradictory duality that yields
incompatible results. On one hand, an employer is prohibited from em-
ploying unauthorized aliens. Conversely, if an employer refuses to hire
or terminates an employee based on ethnic background, the employer
could be liable for discriminatory employment practices. Amendments to
the statute could illuminate a desired course of conduct, thus allowing
employers to safely follow the proper formalities in compliance with
IRCA. Not only would such an approach insulate employers from liabil-
ity, but employees and applicants would also be protected from possible
discriminatory hiring practices.
For example, Congress could require, as a matter of law, that employ-
ers photocopy all documents offered by an applicant purporting to prove
employment status. This would help the employer prove that the docu-
ment appeared genuine on its face, and could prevent possible penalty.
IRCA might also be amended to include a checklist of specific ques-
tions that a potential employer be allowed to ask of any applicant. These
questions, when written by legislators, would be more likely to avoid any
possibility of discrimination during the hiring process. Certainly, the
questions would not be mandatory, but at least the employer would have
a feel for what questions are permitted. If utilized, to avoid discrimina-
tion charges, the employer would have to ask all applicants the questions.
Alternatively, a similar result might be achieved by publishing a list of
questions that would, under no circumstances, be permissible without
committing employment discrimination.
Furthermore, with the advancement of the EVS, employers could be
statutorily required to participate in the service. Such a requirement
[Vol. 5:355
FIRE FIRST AND ASK QUESTIONS LATER
would force employers to verify that all information given by a potential
hiree match SSA records prior to hiring. Such a rule seems less burden-
some with every passing day given the increasing reliance upon electronic
media for daily business operations. This assumes, though, that the SSA's
records are accurate and up to date.
B. Upon Receipt of a Mismatch Letter
A separate plan of action needs to be formulated to address unlawful
employment concerns arising after the date of hire. Though no such stat-
utory structure currently exists, law firms dealing with employment law
issues commonly create such plans for their corporate clients.
For example, a comprehensive plan might include:
1. Do Not Automatically Terminate an Employee After Receiving a
Mismatch Letter:8 7 Receipt of the letter, alone, does not consti-
tute the constructive knowledge required for an IRCA
violation.188
2. Investigate: 189 Check company records to ensure that no typo-
graphical or clerical errors exist.19° Consult the EVS to verify
which company records are inconsistent with SSA information.
Notify the employee of the problem.
3. Employees Verifies all Recorded Information as Correct: Possibly
suggest, that the employee contact the local Social Security office
to correct the problem.' 9 '
4. Employee Admits to Providing False Information: Terminate the
employee at once upon learning that the employee was never au-
thorized for employment in the United States.' 92
5. New Information: Should the employee admit to previously pro-
viding false information, but has since obtained work authoriza-
tion, terminate according to company policies, if any, regarding
false information provided during the hire process.' 93 It is impor-
tant to note that most companies exercise discretion: they do not
always fire when false information has been provided in the appli-
cation process.
6. Always Remain in Contact with the SSA: Maintain a continuous
relationship with the SSA. Ensure that all correspondence is re-
187. Huynh & Nyberg, supra note 51.
188. Id.
189. Lyman et al., supra note 54.
190. Huynh & Nyberg, supra note 51.
191. Social Security "Mismatch" Letter a Trap for the Unwary Employer, supra note
37.
192. Huynh & Nyberg, supra note 51.
193. Id.
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corded in writing to avoid confusion, and to provide evidence that
the employer worked diligently to resolve the situation.
Although such suggestions would not answer every question which may
arise concerning mismatch letters, employers could at least rely on a con-
crete frame of reference. If codified, such an outline could vastly dimin-
ish confusion within the employment sector, and would protect those
employees who are legitimately authorized for work in the United States.
IX. CONCLUSION
As currently issued, the Social Security Administration's mismatch let-
ters have the potential to do great harm. Facing both monetary and crim-
inal penalties, a misinformed employer could arbitrarily terminate
employees on the basis of ethnicity, fearing that the employee lacked
work authorization. Such a result could undermine the trust relationship
that exists between employer and employee. Furthermore, it could lead
to grave injustice through capricious termination, and could have a chil-
ling effect on the willingness to hire ethnic workers. At the heart of the
problem is a lack of information. Congress, the SSA, or the INS could
easily issue guidelines, or instructions, on how to handle the receipt of a
mismatch letter. The plan above is merely a skeleton of the components
such experts might choose to include.
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